Research and links

PMC Somalia (ArmA), covering the somalia crisis

Moderators: Snake Man, Lone Wolf

Locked
Snake Man
Commander-In-Chief
Posts: 8605
Joined: 2000-07-31 22:01:01
Gaming Interests: ArmA, ArmA 2, Falcon 4.0 and OFP.
Editing Interests: All, I (try) to edit everything.
Location: PMC
Contact:

Research and links

Post by Snake Man » 2009-01-16 13:59:02

Here is some research and links for Somalia. Who knows where I pulled them off, text is not written by me.

http://inquirer.philly.com/packages/somalia/

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Mogadishu_(1993)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Task_Force_Ranger

http://novaonline.nvcc.edu/eli/evans/hi ... lia93.html

http://www.militaryfactory.com/battles/ ... adishu.asp

http://www.militaryunits.com/Somalia.htm

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... relief.htm

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... e_hope.htm

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... e_hope.htm

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... index.html

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc ... tm#somalia

SOMALIA - MILITIA

As of January 1991, Somali National Army (SNA) and all related military and security forces disbanded; an indeterminate number of elements reconstituted as clan militias and irregular regional forces.

Until January 1991, Army ground forces organized into twelve divisions composed of four tank brigades, forty-five mechanized and infantry brigades, four commando brigades, one surface-to-air missile brigade, three field artillery brigades, thirty field battalions, and one air defense battalion.

Military equipment was a mixture of old weapons of Soviet and United States origin, none of which could have withstood an attack from the better armed Ethiopian forces. The equipment was outdated and of poor serviceability, largely because of inadequate maintenance capability. As a result, foreign military advisers or technicians performed nearly all maintenance tasks.

Included in the SNA inventory were Centurion, M-41, M-47, T-34, and T-54/T-55 tanks; BRDM-2 and AML-90 reconnaissance vehicles; BTR-40/-50/-60/-152, Fiat 6614/6616, and BMR-600 armored personnel carriers; 100mm, 105mm, 122mm, and 155mm (M-198) towed artillery; 82mm and 120mm mortars; Milan TOW anti-tank guided weapons; 89mm rocket launchers; and 106mm recoilless rifles.

Somalia was exclusively supplied by the Soviet Union until 1977 when the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was terminated. Subsequently Somalia improved relations with United States and received average of US$36 to $US40 million per year of United States military assistance between 1983 and 1986. Levels of military aid during 1980s were insufficient to avert deterioration and collapse of Somali armed forces by 1991.

In the early 1980s, the Somali armed forces were organized and deployed to prevent an Ethiopian attack. By the end of the decade, however, the military concentrated its activities on maintaining internal security. Antigovernment resistance originated from various clan-based guerrilla groups that defended their interests against outsiders, each other, and Siad Barre's soldiers. The availability of weapons in the Horn of Africa and the ability to obtain military aid from foreign nations and Somali expatriate communities enabled the rebels to wage a protracted guerrilla war against Mogadishu.

Beginning in the early 1980s, many Somali officers started attending one of two military schools in Mogadishu. The Siad Barre Military Academy offered general instruction, and the Ahmad Guray War College was a staff school for senior officers. Noncommissioned officers attended the General Daoud Military Academy in Chisimayu. The Weapons School provided courses in specialties such as field artillery, transportation, and communications. The Somali armed forces also maintained instruction centers for personnel from the engineering, railway, and paratroop-commando corps. Despite the existence of these academies and schools, the Somali military relied on foreign training to maintain sophisticated weapons systems and to improve the technical and leadership skills of its personnel. After the breakup of the Somali-Soviet alliance, the SNA largely depended on the United States, Saudi Arabia, France, and Italy for such training. Following the fall of Siad Barre in January 1991 and the disintegration of the armed forces, military training ceased.

Paramilitary forces, which reported to the president via the minister of state, supplemented the SNA. These included a 1,500- man elite border guard; the 20,000-man People's Militia; and the 8,000-man Somali Police Force (SPF), which had an air unit based in Mogadishu consisting of two Dornier Do-28D2 aircraft, neither of which was believed to be operational in early 1992. The Somali Police Force, People's Militia, and National Security Service disbanded as of January 1991.

SOMALIA - AIR FORCE

The Somali Air Force (SAF), initially known as the Somali Aeronautical Corps, operated most of its aircraft from bases near Mogadishu and Hargeysa. Its mission was to support ground forces.

Since the Ogaden War, the SAF's performance had been hindered by inadequate equipment, lack of spare parts, and poor maintenance. During the late 1980s, however, the SAF managed to deploy some of its fighter aircraft against rebels in northern Somalia. Some of these aircraft were kept operational by Zimbabwean contract personnel.

In 1990 the SAF was organized into three fighter ground attack squadrons equipped with J-6 and Hawker Hunter aircraft; three fighter squadrons equipped with MiG-21MF and MiG-17 aircraft; a counterinsurgency squadron equipped with SF-260W aircraft; a transport squadron equipped with An-2, An-24, An-26, BN-2, C-212, and G-222 aircraft; and a helicopter squadron equipped with Mi-4, Mi-8, and Augusta-Bell aircraft. The SAF also possessed a variety of training aircraft such as the MiG-15UTI, the SF-260W, the Yak-11, and the Cessna. The SAF used Somali Airlines aircraft to ferry troops and supplies to war zones.

None of the squadrons have been operational for some time.

SOMALIA - NAVY

In 1965 the Soviet Union helped Somalia establish a navy. As part of its mission to help SNA forces maintain coastal security, the navy maintained bases at Berbera, Mogadishu, and Chisimayu, and a radar site at Merca.

In 1990 the naval inventory included two Soviet Osa-II missile-armed fast attack craft, four Soviet Mol PFT torpedo-armed fast attack craft, and several patrol craft. The Somali navy also possessed a Soviet Polnocny-class landing ship capable of carrying five tanks and 120 soldiers, and four smaller mechanized landing craft. Much of this equipment had been unserviceable since the departure of Soviet military personnel in 1977.

The navy has not been operational since 1991.

History

OPERATION CONTINUE HOPE

On 4 May 1993 the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) assumed responsibility for operations, but the transition was badly managed. Basic U.N. deficiencies in planning, C3I, and political acumen were compounded by an expanded and intrusive mandate; greatly diminished military capabilities; more aggressive Somali opposition; uncertain support from the United States; differences within the coalition; and uncertainty by the Security Council, the Secretariat, and others.

Operation Continue Hope provided support of UNOSOM II to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations by providing personnel, logistical, communications, intelligence support, a quick reaction force, and other elements as required. Over 60 Army aircraft and approximately 1,000 aviation personnel operated in Somalia from 1992 to 1994.

UNOSOM II became a badly flawed peace, with military forces which came to be seen by parties to the local conflict as co-belligerents rather than impartial peacekeepers. In Somalia, peace enforcement was only an implicit element of the original U.N. mandate, which focused on peace-building (disarmament, political reconciliation, and economic rehabilitation). However, after a confrontation between the Somali National Alliance (SNA) and the U.N. led to the killing of twenty-five Pakistani peacekeepers, the Security Council made the operation's peace-enforcement mission explicit. It was executed by both U.N. forces and a 1,000-man U.S. rapid-reaction force under U.S. operational control, with the authority of the United Nations. There was also a 3,000-man U.S. logistics unit under U.N. operational control. A lack of decisiveness, cohesion, and command and control by the undermanned U.N. mission (half the strength of UNITAF, with some 20,000 personnel) and a series of armed clashes between U.S./U.N. forces and the SNA created a virtual state of war and undermined the effectiveness of the U.N. operation. Confusion over the dual-command relationship between the U.S. and UNOSOM II was another complicating factor, with a U.S. general officer serving as both the U.N. deputy forces commander and commander of U.S. forces.

A clash on 3-4 October 1993 left eighteen U.S. personnel dead and seventy-eight wounded, along with over one thousand Somali casualties. Public outcry in the United States contributed to the decision to withdraw U.S. forces in March 1994. That, coupled with continued internal strife and SNA hostility toward the U.N., led to a total U.N. withdrawal in March 1995. This was executed skillfully, without casualties, in a carefully planned combined U.S.-U.N. action.

The killing of Army Rangers in Somalia provoked a resurgence of a debate that began before the Gulf War: when is it appropriate to use military force -- and, more to the point, can you justify using the military in regions in which Americans either do not see their interests at stake or are willing to help only so long as the costs remain very low? Somalia drove home the reality that the Gulf War experience could not serve as a model for other situations where the diplomatic lineup was more confused, the stakes less clear, and the difference between good guys and bad guys less simple to discern. It was also an early indication of the coming debate on the international community's role in internal strife.

OPERATION PROVIDE RELIEF

Operation Provide Relief in Somalia began in August 1992, when the White House announced US military transports would support the multinational United Nations relief effort in Somalia. Ten C-130s and 400 people deployed to Mombasa, Kenya, during Operation Provide Relief, airlifting aid to remote areas in Somalia to reduce reliance on truck convoys. One member of the 86th Supply Squadron deployed with the ground support contingent, USAFE's only contribution to the operation. The Air Force C-130s delivered 48,000 tons of food and medical supplies in six months to international humanitarian organizations, trying to help over three million starving people. When this proved inadequate to stop the massive death and displacement of Somali people (500,000 dead; 1.5 million refugees or displaced), the U.S. in December 1992 launched a major coalition operation to assist and protect humanitarian activities. The operation was successful in stopping the famine and saving an estimated 200,000 lives, as well as de-escalating the high-intensity civil war into low-level, local skirmishes.

OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

Expanded peacekeeping in Somalia began after the failure of UNOSOM I accompanied by the specter of 500,000 Somalis dead from famine by the fall of 1992 and hundreds of thousands more in danger of dying. Clan violence in Somalia interfered with international famine relief efforts, and President Bush sent American troops to protect relief workers in a new operation called Restore Hope. The US-led coalition approved by the Security Council in December 1992 had a mandate of protecting humanitarian operations and creating a secure environment for eventual political reconciliation. At the same time, it had the authority to use all necessary means, including military force. A joint and multinational operation, Restore Hope--called UNITAF (unified task force)--was a US-led, UN-sanctioned operation that included protection of humanitarian assistance and other peace-enforcement operations.

While the US failed to acknowledge the political dimensions of the situation at the highest political levels (which would lead to tragic results in the second phase, UNOSOM II), Operation Restore Hope was nevertheless a humanitarian success.

On December 3rd, U.N. Security Resolution 794 authorized the U.S. led intervention "to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible." The US Army participated in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia from 03 December 1992 to 4 May 1993. On 09 December 1992 the United States Marines came shore in Mogadishu and quickly established an expeditionary infrastructure to facilitate security and the delivery of food to the starving Somalis. On December 11th, the Marines established a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) and collocated it with the U.N.’s Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC). By doing this, the CMOC quickly became the national focus point for NGO/U.S. military coordination.

During Operation Restore Hope, USCENTCOM was the unified command. It provided guidance and arranged support and resources for the operational commander. The commander of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) commanded a JTF/CTF composed of air, naval, Marine, Army, and special operations forces (SOF) components, in addition to the forces provided by countries contributing to the US-led, combined coalition. As the responsible unified command, USCENTCOM performed numerous tasks contributing to the success of Operation Restore Hope. Key areas included shaping a clear, achievable mission statement for the operational commander, shaping an international coalition, and orchestrating the transition to eventual UN control.

In 1992, three Ready Reserve Force vessels were activated to support the United Nation's humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in Somalia. These included two offshore petroleum discharge system (OPDS) tankers, the AMERICAN OSPREY and POTOMAC. The TS EMPIRE STATE, normally used for training students at the New York State Maritime Academy, was activated to repatriate troops from Somalia.

Although Somalia was a US Central Command responsibility, USAFE provided air refueling support at Moron Air Base, Spain, and sent contingents of security police, communicators, and postal specialists to Somalia and Kenya.

The Army force (ARFOR) AO included over 21,000 square miles. Over these distances, units conducted air assault operations, patrols, security operations, cordons and searches, and other combat operations in support of humanitarian agencies. Other ARFOR operations included building or rebuilding over 1,100 kilometers of roads, constructing two Bailey Bridges, escorting hundreds of convoys, confiscating thousands of weapons, and providing theater communications. Due to these efforts, humanitarian agencies declared an end to the food emergency, community elders became empowered, and marketplaces were revitalized and functioning.

Throughout Operation Restore Hope, MP units were in great demand because of their ability to serve as a force multiplier. Marine force (MARFOR) and ARFOR commanders quickly took advantage of the MP's significant firepower, mobility, and communications and used them effectively as a force multiplier conducting security-related missions as one of their combat forces. Doctrinal missions included security of main supply routes (MSRs), military and NGO convoys, critical facilities, and very important persons (VIPs); customs; detention of local civilians suspected of felony crimes against US force or Somali citizens; and criminal investigative division (CID) support as the JTF's executive agency for joint investigations. MPs responded to a significant number of hostile acts taken against US forces, NGOs, and civilians by armed bandits and "technicals" and to factional fighting that threatened US forces or relief efforts. They also supported the JTF weapons confiscation policy by conducting recons and gathering information and intelligence (human intelligence [HUMINT]) about the size, location, and capabilities of factions operating throughout the ARFOR and MARFOR AOs. This information included the location of sizeable weapons caches. MPs also had an expanded role in the actual confiscation of weapons by establishing checkpoints and roadblocks along MSRs, within small villages, and within the congested, confined urban environment of Mogadishu. Serving in both a combat and CS role, MPs also participated in a larger, combined arms show-of-force operation (air assault) in the city of Afgooye.

By March 1993, mass starvation had been overcome, and security was much improved. At its peak, almost 30,000 US military personnel participated in the operation, along with 10,000 personnel from twenty-four other states. Despite the absence of political agreement among the rival forces, periodic provocations, and occasional military responses by UNITAF, the coalition retained its impartiality and avoided open combat with Somali factions--blending its coercive powers with political dialogue, psychological operations, and highly visible humanitarian activities.

Operation Restore Hope demonstrated the usefulness of engineers in operations other than war. Somalia's austere landscape and climate posed challenges similar to or greater than the ones encountered during Operations Desert Shield/Storm, including a harsh desert environment, resupply over great distances limited resources. and a devastated infrastructure. The deployed engineer force was a joint and multinational effort, building on the engineer capabilities found with each service component and coalition partner. Engineers provided standard maps and imagery products, detected and cleared hundreds of land mines and pieces of unexploded ordnance built base camps for US and coalition forces, and drilled water wells. They constructed and improved over 2,000 kilometers of roads, built and repaired several Bailey bridges, upgraded and maintained airfields. and participated in local civic action projects that helped open schools, orphanages, hospitals, and local water supplies.

Operation Restore Hope demonstrated some of the problems that can be experienced as a result of incomplete or ineffective political analysis. Because the operation was purely ‘humanitarian’ with no long-term aims, the CMOC lacked enough Army Civil Affairs personnel. Given their stellar performance during Operation Provide Comfort this at first glance appears strange. While Charlie Company, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, was sent to Somalia, none of the reserve component (despite receiving call-up orders) were ever activated. Two reasons appear in the literature; activation of such units generally implies a long-term commitment and the Marines (the short-term expeditionary unit first sent to Somalia) thought they did not need them - both reasons fitted in well with the political climate of Washington DC in late 1992.

By early 1993, sector ‘coordination centers’ had been established in eight areas throughout Somalia. They served as focal points for civil-military priorities within that region and provided an ideal way to further the all-important NGO/military dialogue process. While there was a lack of political resolve from many of the major players, the CMOC provided the liaison capability for many of the players at the ‘coal face’ that enabled Operation Support Hope to be the humanitarian success that it was.

On 4 May 1993 the UN-led operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) assumed responsibility for operations.
PMC since 1984

Editing knowledge, visit PMC Editing Wiki
Addon manuals, visit PMC addons/mods online manuals
View our videos in PMC Youtube channel.

PMC Tactical forum Advanced Search is power.

hueycat6
Recruit
Posts: 27
Joined: 2007-09-26 22:12:01

Re: Research and links

Post by hueycat6 » 2009-01-25 16:28:55

Heres a good link for the background on whats going on now. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cac ... news]=1029 copy and paste the whole link or it wont give you the right page. oh and a good 93 article by NY times http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.h ... wanted=all
Image

hueycat6
Recruit
Posts: 27
Joined: 2007-09-26 22:12:01

Re: Research and links

Post by hueycat6 » 2009-02-03 21:28:42

I was looking into buildings mostly in or around Mogadishu. Well i saved what i found, i looked for everything from huts to mini malls, i didnt find too much modern buildings im sure there are some but no one wants to publish pics of them i guess. http://s279.photobucket.com/albums/kk15 ... s/?start=0

Here are some sites with some great photography of somalia during all periods
http://www.afmaal.com/gallery.html
http://www.afmaal.com/gallery/postcards.html
http://www.mudulood.com/SomMogadishuPictures2.html

There a bit out of the way but most of these pics i have never seen before.
Image

banana
2nd Lt
Posts: 92
Joined: 2008-10-09 15:40:51

Re: Research and links

Post by banana » 2009-02-04 07:52:26

Hi,
You did not find pictures of the modern Mogadishu?

http://static.panoramio.com/photos/original/345259.jpg

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/c ... ilding.jpg

etc.

Found pictures of the Stadium as well

http://www.panoramio.com/photo/2150996

Snake Man
Commander-In-Chief
Posts: 8605
Joined: 2000-07-31 22:01:01
Gaming Interests: ArmA, ArmA 2, Falcon 4.0 and OFP.
Editing Interests: All, I (try) to edit everything.
Location: PMC
Contact:

Re: Research and links

Post by Snake Man » 2009-02-05 11:04:19

VXR at BIS forums pointed out the Olympic hotel Google sketchup model. It actually includes image/model of Olympic hotel and the target building.

Check the link here.
PMC since 1984

Editing knowledge, visit PMC Editing Wiki
Addon manuals, visit PMC addons/mods online manuals
View our videos in PMC Youtube channel.

PMC Tactical forum Advanced Search is power.

hueycat6
Recruit
Posts: 27
Joined: 2007-09-26 22:12:01

Re: Research and links

Post by hueycat6 » 2009-02-05 12:48:45

There are actually quite a few landmarks that not many people know about but that you cant miss if you live in mogadishu. Here's one
Image
Dhagaxtuur Monument

No clue if it has been scared/messed up in any way.
Source, including other landmark pics too: http://www.mudulood.com/SomMogadishuPictures2.html

Thanks for the info Snake
Image

User avatar
SonarMB
Recruit
Posts: 14
Joined: 2009-05-12 03:06:18
Gaming Interests: ArmA, ArmA 2 and OFP.
Editing Interests: All, I (try) to edit everything.

Re: Research and links

Post by SonarMB » 2009-05-21 14:29:31

I have the book laying around here somewhere amongst my military stuff. I'll find it and scan some of the more pertiant stuff.
Image

Snake Man
Commander-In-Chief
Posts: 8605
Joined: 2000-07-31 22:01:01
Gaming Interests: ArmA, ArmA 2, Falcon 4.0 and OFP.
Editing Interests: All, I (try) to edit everything.
Location: PMC
Contact:

Re: Research and links

Post by Snake Man » 2009-11-05 15:28:53

Few times now I've tried to google up some olympic hotel and target building pictures but can't really find any... so far I've found precisely one picture each. Quite good one for target building and lower-left corner picture of olympic hotel.

Here is the target building:
Image
Source.

Here is a real life Pentagon video of the raid, showing that indeed this is the real building: video.

Olympic hotel:
Image
Source.

I find it really really strange that there is no available photos of these two buildings, except the one I've found so far. If anyone finds real photos, please post them here.
PMC since 1984

Editing knowledge, visit PMC Editing Wiki
Addon manuals, visit PMC addons/mods online manuals
View our videos in PMC Youtube channel.

PMC Tactical forum Advanced Search is power.

Snake Man
Commander-In-Chief
Posts: 8605
Joined: 2000-07-31 22:01:01
Gaming Interests: ArmA, ArmA 2, Falcon 4.0 and OFP.
Editing Interests: All, I (try) to edit everything.
Location: PMC
Contact:

Re: Research and links

Post by Snake Man » 2010-06-16 18:47:07

I'm still trying to find good reference photos for buildings, if anyone knows any, please post.

Here is batch of images I googled up trying to find building pictures.

http://majimbokenya.com/home/wp-content ... adishu.jpg

http://www.firstbattalion.au.com/somalia.htm

http://geopolicraticus.files.wordpress. ... adishu.jpg

http://www.biyokulule.com/sawiro/sawira ... OSOM27.jpg

http://www.biyokulule.com/sawiro/sawira ... 994(1).jpg

http://www.biyokulule.com/sawiro/sawira ... 994(2).jpg

http://www.biyokulule.com/sawiro/sawira ... 994(3).jpg

http://racismandnationalconsciousnessne ... =420&h=498

http://go2.wordpress.com/?id=725X1342&s ... itimacy%2F

http://sahelblog.files.wordpress.com/20 ... dishu.jpeg

http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/4 ... gunsap.jpg

http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/4 ... rolafp.jpg

http://www.waagacusub.com/images/Mog%20 ... bursan.jpg

http://www.waagacusub.com/images/Mogdishu%20mosque.jpg

http://www.waagacusub.com/images/Mogadi ... mosque.jpg

http://www.waagacusub.com/images/Mogadi ... 201960.jpg

http://www.waagacusub.com/images/Mog%20View%20photo.jpg

http://www.waagacusub.com/images/Muuqaa ... adishu.jpg

http://www.waagacusub.com/images/Mogadi ... oryaan.jpg

http://www.waagacusub.com/images/Mogadi ... iimeed.jpg

http://somaliswiss.files.wordpress.com/ ... adishu.jpg

http://warcrimes.foreignpolicyblogs.com ... adishu.jpg

http://www.cbsnews.com/images/2006/09/3 ... 1550e8.jpg

http://wardheernews.com/Articles_2010/A ... age004.jpg

http://wardheernews.com/Articles_2010/A ... age003.jpg

http://img.timeinc.net/time/daily/2007/ ... hu0104.jpg

http://www.biyokulule.com/Mogadishu%201950s%28b%29.jpg

http://blogs.mirror.co.uk/developing-wo ... fam%29.jpg

http://ipsnews.net/pictures/20080809_Mo ... ighRes.jpg

http://media.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/i ... ishu%20430

http://blogs.mirror.co.uk/developing-wo ... Oxfam).jpg

http://theoriginalwinger.com/wp-content ... dishu1.jpg

http://theoriginalwinger.com/wp-content ... dishu2.jpg

http://theoriginalwinger.com/wp-content ... dishu3.jpg

http://www.biyokulule.com/sawiro/sawira ... eet3_1.jpg

http://www.biyokulule.com/sawiro/sawira ... rmy1_1.jpg

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/c ... ilding.jpg

http://img390.imageshack.us/img390/2859 ... shuqr0.jpg

http://www.blackagendareport.com/images ... aScene.jpg

http://www.biyokulule.com/sawiro/sawira ... cadde3.jpg

http://www.biyokulule.com/sawiro/sawira ... sts9_1.jpg

http://www.biyokulule.com/sawiro/sawira ... rport3.jpg

http://mogadishu.info/photos/7.jpg

http://mogadishu.info/photos/6.jpg

http://mogadishu.info/photos/scan14.jpg

http://mogadishu.info/photos/BeachesMogadishu.jpg

http://mogadishu.info/photos/Hayslip1.jpg

http://mogadishu.info/bakaara_market_at_galleryfull.jpg

http://img504.imageshack.us/img504/967/ ... ve1pp2.jpg

http://img136.imageshack.us/img136/3827 ... ve2sw6.jpg

http://img510.imageshack.us/img510/2185 ... ve3vm1.jpg

http://img440.imageshack.us/img440/796/ ... ve4dg7.jpg

http://img294.imageshack.us/img294/2457 ... ve5jc8.jpg

http://img512.imageshack.us/img512/2861 ... ve6pq5.jpg

http://img232.imageshack.us/img232/2136 ... ve7gl1.jpg

http://www.bartamaha.com/wp-content/upl ... adishu.jpg

http://tehresistance.files.wordpress.co ... e_m107.jpg

http://trendsupdates.com/wp-content/upl ... dishu1.jpg

http://frontlineclub.com/blogs/frontlin ... 964039.jpg

http://tehresistance.files.wordpress.co ... g_3270.jpg

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/c ... dishu.JPEG

http://www.bartamaha.com/wp-content/upl ... panies.jpg

http://frontlineclub.com/blogs/frontline/18467514.jpg

http://images.travelpod.com/users/usmcs ... 5_1930.jpg

http://images.travelpod.com/users/usmcs ... 5_1932.jpg

http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_QfVWU-2pVL4/S ... B2009..jpg

http://warisboring.com/wp-content/uploa ... 7small.jpg

http://www.rfi.fr/actuen/images/113/som ... ace432.jpg

http://www.rnw.nl/data/files/imagecache ... a345_o.jpg

http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_QfVWU-2pVL4/S ... B2009..jpg

http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_QfVWU-2pVL4/S ... B2008..jpg

http://warisboring.com/wp-content/uploa ... 7small.jpg

http://www.nation.co.ke/image/view/-/54 ... T-_022.jpg

http://mw2.google.com/mw-panoramio/phot ... 941720.jpg

http://vindenes.nu/images/photo/Church.JPG

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/c ... hedral.jpg

http://www.france24.com/static/infograp ... ie_003.jpg

http://mogadishuimages.files.wordpress. ... ropped.jpg

http://mw2.google.com/mw-panoramio/phot ... 535224.jpg

http://wardheernews.com/Articles_2010/J ... _Uruba.jpg

http://www.eameco.com/images/MU_Building2.jpg
PMC since 1984

Editing knowledge, visit PMC Editing Wiki
Addon manuals, visit PMC addons/mods online manuals
View our videos in PMC Youtube channel.

PMC Tactical forum Advanced Search is power.

Snake Man
Commander-In-Chief
Posts: 8605
Joined: 2000-07-31 22:01:01
Gaming Interests: ArmA, ArmA 2, Falcon 4.0 and OFP.
Editing Interests: All, I (try) to edit everything.
Location: PMC
Contact:

Re: Research and links

Post by Snake Man » 2010-06-21 14:52:04

Please continue the discussion in ArmA 2 area Research, images and links.

Topic closed.

Thanks.
PMC since 1984

Editing knowledge, visit PMC Editing Wiki
Addon manuals, visit PMC addons/mods online manuals
View our videos in PMC Youtube channel.

PMC Tactical forum Advanced Search is power.

Locked

Who is online

Users browsing this forum: No registered users and 1 guest